'There is no reason for saying that [six months in the life of a baby born with invariably fatal Tay Sachs disease] are a life span oflesser worth to God than living seventy years before the onset of irreversible degeneration .... All our days and years are of equal worth whatever the consequences; death is no more a tragedy at one time than at another time' (4) .
This passage appears to be saying that all human life is of equal worth; neither its duration, nor its quality, makes a difference to how much it is to be valued. Long Kuhse 199 whatever the consequence, then why are the days oflife gained by treatments which 'prolong dying' not also of equal worth? After all, talk of 'prolonging dying' is really a misleading way of referring to treatments which prolong life, and it is only by this misleading use of language that Ramsey is able to conceal from at least some readers -Long, apparently, among them -the glaring contradiction between the passages we have quoted. We are all either alive or dead, and until we are dead, we are still alive. Of course, we would say that to gain extra days of life by continuing the treatment of babies in the last stages of Tay Sachs disease is not desirable because the quality of these extra days is so poor that they are without value for the infant, or for anyone else. To say this, however, is to abandon the view that all life is of equal value. When it comes to the crunch, that, in fact, is what Ramsey does. That he should do so is a credit to his humanity and compassion, but not to the consistency of his thinking (5).
Ramsey is not the only one who charges off with his allegiance to the doctrine of the equal value of human life emblazoned on his banner, only to shy away from the idea of prolonging a life which is of dismal quality and without prospects of improvement. In our book Should the Baby Live? we cite at length the court-room testimony of Dr C Everett Koop, Surgeon General of the United States in the Reagan administration and a champion ofthe Right to Life movement, in defending the 'Baby Doe' Guidelines. As we show there, Koop was forced to admit under cross-examination that in the case of an infant with 'essentially no intestine', he would not advocate that the infant be kept alive on hyper-alimentation for eighteen months or more. Yet this admission was plainly incompatible with the claim that all human life is of equal value, irrespective of its quality or prospects.
Perhaps there are some who take a theological view about the value of human life, and follow through this view consistently. If there are such people, it may be there is no way in which we can refute their position, short of refuting some of their theological premises, such as that there is a God and that this God holds certain views about the value of life. We will rest content ifwe show that such people are much more rare than is commonly assumed. Koop and Ramsey are not among them.
